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Abstract—We consider interactive computation of randomized
functions between two users with the following privacy require-
ment: the interactive communication should not reveal to either
user any extra information about the other user’s input and
output other than what can be inferred from the user’s own input
and output. We also consider the case where privacy is required
against only one of the users. For both cases, we give single-letter
expressions for feasibility and optimal rates of communication.
Then we discuss the role of common randomness and interaction
in both privacy settings.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a function computation problem between two
users, Alice and Bob (Fig. 1). They observe memoryless sources
(inputs) X and Y respectively and communicate interactively
through a noiseless communication link to compute randomized
functions Z1 and Z2 respectively. Common randomness which
is independent of X and Y is available to both of them. They
want to compute the functions in such a way that neither of
them learn any extra information about the other user’s input
and output other than what its own input and output reveal.
We assume that both Alice and Bob are honest-but-curious,
i.e., they follow the given protocol, but will try to infer extra
information during the protocol. Such a setup is called two-
user secure computation, and it is shown in Fig. 1. The secure
computation problem is specified by a pair (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ),
where qXY is the input distribution from which Alice and Bob
get their inputs X and Y respectively, and qZ1Z2|XY specifies
the output distribution.
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Fig. 1. Secure interactive randomized function computation. The case where
Alice starts the communication is shown. Privacy against Alice requires that
M1, · · · ,Mr should not reveal anything about Y
n, Zn
2
other than what can
be inferred from Xn, Zn
1
. Similar conditions should hold for privacy against
Bob.
Two-user interactive computation (with no privacy) has
been extensively studied in computer science literature [1]
as well as in information theory literature [2]–[6]. In [2],
Kaspi considered two-user interactive source coding. Interactive
function computation of deterministic functions was addressed
in [3], [4]. The problem of computing randomized functions
was studied in [5], [6].
Two-user secure computation (as described above) has been
studied in cryptography under computational as well as infor-
mation theoretic secrecy (see [7] and references therein). Not
all functions are information theoretically securely computable
by two users interacting over a noiseless link. A combinatorial
characterization of securely computable deterministic functions
was given in [8]. An alternative characterization using the
common randomness generated by interactive communication
was provided in [9]. A special case of the two-user secure
computation where only Bob produces output using a single
transmission from Alice was studied in [10], [11]. For this
special case, privacy against both the users and privacy only
against Alice were addressed in [10], and privacy only against
Bob was considered in [11]. Single-letter expressions for
optimal communication rates were obtained for these particular
cases. A combinatorial characterization of two-user securely
computable randomized functions is still not known, and some
partial results were obtained in [12], [13]. A characterization
of two-user securely computable output distributions with no
inputs and no common randomness was given in [14]. In
contrast to these, secrecy against an eavesdropper who has
access to the interactive communication was studied in [15].
We consider our two-user secure computation problem in
two privacy settings: (i) when privacy is required against
both the users, (ii) when privacy is required against only one
of the users. For each of these settings, we show that the
set of asymptotically securely computable (see Definition 2)
functions is the same as the that of one-shot perfectly securely
computable functions (whose characterization still remains
open as mentioned above). Further, we give single-letter
expressions for the asymptotic rate regions. From the single-
letter expressions we observe some interesting facts. For
instance, (i) we show that for a class of functions (including
deterministic functions), checking secure computability (with
privacy requirement against both the users) is equivalent to
checking whether cut-set bounds for computation with no
privacy requirements can be met. (ii) When no privacy is
required, any function can be computed in two rounds by
exchanging the inputs. However, there are functions for which
more rounds of interaction strictly improve the communication
rate [4]. When privacy is required against both users, as was
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shown in [8], if a function is securely computable, depending
on the function, a certain minimum number of rounds of
interaction is required for secure computation. We show that
for a class of functions including deterministic functions, we
can achieve any point in the rate region with this minimum
number of rounds of interaction. (iii) When privacy is required
against both the users, we give a necessary and sufficient
condition on (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) for the common randomness to
be helpful in improving the communication rate.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND DEFINITIONS
A secure randomized function computation problem is
specified by a pair
(
qXY , qZ1Z2|XY
)
, where X,Y, Z1 and
Z2 take values in X ,Y,Z1 and Z2 respectively. Inputs to
Alice and Bob are Xn and Y n, respectively, where (Xi, Yi),
i = 1, . . . n, are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
with distribution qXY . Both the users have access to a common
random variable W , which is independent of (Xn, Y n) and
uniformly distributed over its alphabet W = [1 : 2nR0 ]. The
users interactively communicate in r rounds over a noiseless
bidirectional link. Their goal is to securely compute the random-
ized function qZ1Z2|XY , i.e., to output Z
n
1 and Z
n
2 , respectively,
such that they are (approximately) distributed according to
qZn1 Zn2 |XnY n(z
n
1 , z
n
2 |x
n, yn) := Πni=1qZ1Z2|XY (z1i, z2i|xi, yi)
while preserving privacy in the sense that a user does not learn
any additional information about the other user’s input and
output other than what can be inferred from the user’s own
input and output. We consider this problem in two different
cases: (i) when privacy is required against both the users, (ii)
when privacy is required against only one of the users. In
both the cases we wish to determine the corresponding sets
of achievable rates for any arbitrary r ∈ N number of rounds.
Next we present the formal details of the problem statement
assuming that Alice starts the communication.
Definition 1. A protocol Πn with r interactive rounds of
communication consists of
• a set of r randomized encoders with p.m.f.’s
pE1(mi|x
n, w,m[1:i−1]) for odd numbers i ∈ [1 : r] and
pE2(mi|y
n, w,m[1:i−1]) for even numbers i ∈ [1 : r],
where Mi is the message transmitted in the i
th round,
• two randomized decoders pD1(zn1 |x
n, w,m[1:r]) and
pD2(zn2 |y
n, w,m[1:r]),
Let p(induced)Xn,Y n,W,M[1:r],Zn1 ,Zn2
denote the induced distribution
of the protocol Πn.
p(induced)(w, xn, yn,m[1:r], z
n
1 , z
n
2 ) =
1
2nR0
n∏
i=1
q(xi, yi)×

∏
i:odd
pE1(mi|x
n, w,m[1:i−1])
∏
j:even
pE2(mj |y
n, w,m[1:j−1])


× pD1(zn1 |x
n, w,m[1:r])p
D2(zn2 |y
n, w,m[1:r]).
Definition 2. (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) is asymptotically securely
computable in r rounds with privacy against both the users, if
there exists a sequence of protocols Πn, such that for every
ǫ > 0, there exists a large enough n such that
∥∥∥p(induced)Xn,Y n,Zn1 ,Zn2 − qXn,Y n,Zn1 ,Zn2
∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫ, (1)
I(M[1:r],W ;Y
n, Zn2 |X
n, Zn1 ) ≤ nǫ, (2)
I(M[1:r],W ;X
n, Zn1 |Y
n, Zn2 ) ≤ nǫ, (3)
where qXn,Y n,Zn1 ,Zn2 (x
n, yn, zn1 , z
n
2 ) :=
Πni=1
[
qXY (xi, yi)qZ1Z2|XY (z1i, z2i|xi, yi)
]
.
Note that Markov chain (2) corresponds to privacy condition
against Alice, which requires that Alice should not learn any
additional information about Bob’s input and output other than
what can be inferred from her own input and output. Similarly,
(3) corresponds to the privacy condition against Bob.
Definition 3. (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) is perfectly securely com-
putable in r rounds with privacy against both the users, if there
exists a protocol with n = 1 such that (1)-(3) are satisfied with
ǫ = 0.
Definition 4. An (n,R0, R12, R21) protocol is a protocol Πn
such that the alphabet of W is W = [1 : 2nR0 ] and
R12 =
1
n
∑
i:odd
log |Mi|,
R21 =
1
n
∑
i:even
log |Mi|,
where Mi is the alphabet of Mi, i ∈ [1 : r].
Definition 5. For a given pair (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ), a rate triple
(R0, R12, R21) is said to be achievable in r rounds with
privacy against both the users, if there exists a sequence of
(n,R0, R12, R21) protocols, such that for every ǫ > 0, there
exists a large enough n satisfying (1)-(3).
Definition 6. The rate region RAB−pvtA (r) (note that the
subscript A denotes that Alice starts the communication)
with privacy against both the users, is the closure of all the
achievable rate triples (R0, R12, R21).
RAB−pvtB (r) can also be defined in a similar fashion for the
scenario when Bob starts the communication. We are interested
in the region RAB−pvt(r) := RAB−pvtA (r)
⋃
RAB−pvtB (r).
Let RAB−pvt :=
⋃∞
r=1R
AB−pvt(r). Notice that the above
definitions are for the case when privacy is required against
both the users. RA−pvtA (r), R
B−pvt
A (r) and so on can also
be defined in a similar fashion for the cases when privacy is
required only against Alice and privacy is required only against
Bob, respectively. For example, for the case when privacy is
required only against Alice, the definitions will require (1)-(2)
only and not (3).
III. RATE REGION
We present our single-letter characterizations of securely
computable randomized functions and the rate regions. Proofs
can be found in an extended version of this paper.
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Theorem 1. (i) (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) is asymptotically securely
computable in r rounds with privacy against both the users,
with Alice starting the communication if and only if there exists
a conditional p.m.f. p(u[1:r]|x, y, z1, z2) satisfying
Ui − (U[1:i−1], X)− Y, if i is odd, (4)
Ui − (U[1:i−1], Y )−X, if i is even, (5)
Z1 − (U[1:r], X)− (Y, Z2), (6)
Z2 − (U[1:r], Y )− (X,Z1), (7)
U[1:r] − (X,Z1)− (Y, Z2), (8)
U[1:r] − (Y, Z2)− (X,Z1). (9)
(ii) RAB−pvtA (r) is given by the set of all non-negative rate
triples (R0, R12, R21) such that
R12 ≥ I(X;Z2|Y ), (10)
R21 ≥ I(Y ;Z1|X), (11)
R0 +R12 ≥ I(X;Z2|Y ) + I(U1;Z1, Z2|X,Y ), (12)
R0 +R12 +R21 ≥ I(X;Z2|Y ) + I(Y ;Z1|X)
+ I(Z1;Z2|X,Y ), (13)
for some conditional p.m.f. p(u[1:r]|x, y, z1, z2) satisfy-
ing (4)-(9), |U1| ≤ |X ||Y||Z1||Z2| + 5 and |Ui| ≤
|X ||Y||Z1||Z2|
∏i−1
j=1 |Uj |+ 4, ∀i > 1.
Remark 1. Part (i) of Theorem 1 implies that a pair
(qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) is asymptotically securely computable in r
rounds with privacy against both the users if and only if it is
perfectly securely computable in r rounds with privacy against
both the users. Note that this is similar to [10, Theorem 3].
Moreover, since the conditions do not depend on common
randomness, as expected, the presence or absence of common
randomness does not affect the asymptotic secure computability
of a pair (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ).
Remark 2. Inequality (12) on R0+R12 makes the rate region
RAB−pvtA (r) asymmetric. This is in fact due to the assumption
that Alice starts the communication. This is similar to the
non-symmetry of the rate region observed in [5, Theorem 1].
Our proof of part (ii) of Theorem 1 (which is omitted here)
is along similar lines as [5, Theorem 1]. Constraints (10)-(13)
appear in [5, Theorem 1] in a different form. The difference is
because of the simplification possible here due to the additional
constraints (8)-(9), which gives us (as shown in the Appendix)
I(X;U[1:r]|Y ) = I(X;Z2|Y ), (14)
I(Y ;U[1:r]|X) = I(Y ;Z1|X), (15)
I(U[1:r];Z1, Z2|X,Y ) = I(Z1;Z2|X,Y ). (16)
Remark 3. Substituting X = Y = ∅ in part (i) of Theorem 1
recovers a result of [14] which states that a distribution qZ1,Z2
is securely computable if and only if C(Z1;Z2) = I(Z1;Z2),
where C(Z1;Z2) := min
Z1−W−Z2
I(Z1, Z2;W ) is Wyner com-
mon information [16]. To see this, note that C(Z1;Z2) =
I(Z1;Z2) + min
Z1−W−Z2
(I(Z1;W |Z2) + I(Z2;W |Z1)). Fur-
thermore, when R0 = 0, it can be shown using part (ii) of
Theorem 1 and (16) that the optimal sum-rate is R12 +R21 =
C(Z1;Z2) = I(Z1;Z2).
Note that Theorem 1 is for any fixed number of rounds
r. The following corollary gives the region RAB−pvt. Notice
that the description of region RAB−pvt does not involve any
auxiliary random variables.
Corollary 1. If (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) is asymptotically securely
computable with privacy against both the users, then
RAB−pvt is given by the set of all non-negative rate triples
(R0, R12, R21) such that
R12 ≥ I(X;Z2|Y ), (17)
R21 ≥ I(Y ;Z1|X), (18)
R0 +R12 +R21 ≥ I(X;Z2|Y ) + I(Y ;Z1|X)
+ I(Z1;Z2|X,Y ). (19)
Furthermore, suppose rmin is the minimum number of rounds
required with either Alice or Bob starting the communication
for (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) to be securely computable with privacy
against both the parties. Then RAB−pvt(rmin + 1) = R
AB−pvt.
For computing randomized function (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) with-
out any privacy guarantees, the cut-set lower bounds can
be shown to be R12 ≥ I(X;Z2|Y ), R21 ≥ I(Y ;Z1|X).
The following theorem shows that for a class of functions
including deterministic functions, these cut-set lower bounds
for computation (without privacy) are met if and only if the
function is securely computable with privacy against both
the users. Let the rate region RNo-privacyA (r) be defined along
the same lines as Definition 6 (except that only correctness
condition (1) is required).
Theorem 2. Suppose the function (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) is such
that H(Z1|X,Y, Z2) = 0 & H(Z2|X,Y, Z1) = 0 (e.g., a
deterministic function). The function is securely computable
in r rounds with privacy against both the users if and only
if there exists R0 such that
(
R0, I(X;Z2|Y ), I(Y ;Z1|X)
)
∈
RNo-privacyA (r).
We prove this in the Appendix. The ‘only if’ part will follow
from Theorem 1 while we show the ‘if’ part by showing that
any protocol for computation without privacy that meets the
cut-set bounds must satisfy the privacy conditions as well.
When privacy is required only against Alice, clearly, any
(qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) is securely computable in at most 2 rounds
with Alice starting the communication, as follows. Alice can
transmit her input to Bob who can compute the functions
according to qZ1Z2|XY , and send Z1 back to Alice. Part (i)
of the following theorem considers the feasibility of 1 round
protocols whereas part (ii) characterizes the rate region for an
arbitrary number of rounds r.
Theorem 3. (i) (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) is asymptotically securely
computable in one round with privacy only against Alice, with
Alice starting the communication if and only if there exists a
conditional p.m.f. p(u1|x, y, z1, z2) satisfying (a) U1 −X −
3
Y , (b) Z1 − (U1, X) − (Y, Z2), (c) Z2 − (U1, Y ) − (X,Z1),
(d) U1 − (X,Z1)− (Y, Z2).
(ii) RA−pvtA (r) is given by the set of all non-negative rate triples
(R0, R12, R21) such that
R12 ≥ I(X;U[1:r]|Y ),
R21 ≥ I(Y ;Z1|X),
R0 +R12 ≥ I(X;U[1:r]|Y ) + I(U1;Z1|X,Y ),
R0 +R12 +R21 ≥ I(X;U[1:r]|Y ) + I(Y ;Z1|X)
+ I(U[1:r];Z1|X,Y ),
for some conditional p.m.f. p(u[1:r]|x, y, z1, z2) satisfying (4)-
(7) and (8).
Note that similar cardinality bounds on auxiliary random
variables as in Theorem 1 and similar statements as in Remark 1
hold true for Theorem 3 also. A theorem similar to Theorem 3
holds for the case when privacy is required only against Bob
and it can be found in the extended version.
IV. ROLE OF INTERACTION AND COMMON RANDOMNESS
It is clear from Remark 1 that secure computability of
a pair (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) does not depend on the common
randomness. Discussion on the role of common randomness in
this section will focus on its effect on the rate region. In [8],
it was shown that for any positive integer r ≥ 2, there exist
deterministic functions Z1 and Z2 which require minimum
r rounds of communication to securely compute Z1 and Z2.
As in Corollary 1, we denote the minimum number of rounds
required for secure computation by rmin. It can be inferred
from Corollary 1 that, when privacy is required against both
the users, interaction will not help to enlarge the rate region
beyond rmin + 1 rounds. Discussion on the role of interaction
below will focus on whether more number of rounds than rmin
helps to reduce the rates.
A. Privacy required against both the users
• For a pair
(
qXY , qZ1Z2|XY
)
, common randomness
improves the sum rate R12 + R21 if and only if Z1
and Z2 are conditionally dependent given (X,Y ). Hence,
for deterministic functions, common randomness does not
reduce the sum rate.
Suppose Z1 and Z2 are conditionally independent given
(X,Y ). Then due to the fact that I(U1;Z1, Z2|X,Y ) ≤
I(U[1:r];Z1, Z2|X,Y ) = I(Z1;Z2|X,Y ) (equality follows
from (16)), (12) and (13) in Theorem 1 become redundant.
Then the characterization of the rate region does not involve
common randomness, which implies that common randomness
is not helpful when Z1 and Z2 are conditionally independent
given (X,Y ). Now suppose Z1 and Z2 are conditionally de-
pendent given (X,Y ), in the absence of common randomness,
the optimal sum rate R12+R21 is I(X;Z2|Y )+I(Y ;Z1|X)+
I(Z1;Z2|X,Y ) for the same reasons as above. In the presence
of common randomness with rate R0, this sum rate can be re-
duced to I(X;Z2|Y )+I(Y ;Z1|X)+
[
I(Z1;Z2|X,Y )−R0
]
+
,
where [x]+ = max{x, 0}.
• Interaction does not improve the sum-rate R12+R21.
Interaction does not help to enlarge the rate region when
i) I(Z1;Z2|X,Y ) = 0, and hence when Z1, Z2 are
deterministic functions, ii) there is large enough common
randomness.
Fix some R0. Since I(U1;Z1, Z2|X,Y ) ≤
I(U[1:r];Z1, Z2|X,Y ) = I(Z1;Z2|X,Y ) (equality follows
from (16)), we get from Theorem 1 that optimal sum-rate
R12+R21 is I(X;Z2|Y )+ I(Y ;Z1|X)+
[
I(Z1;Z2|X,Y )−
R0
]
+
, which is the same for any number of rounds greater
than or equal to rmin. This shows that sum-rate cannot be
reduced with more rounds of interaction.
When I(Z1;Z2|X,Y ) = 0, due to the same reasons as
mentioned above, the rate region is characterized by (10) and
(11), which does not depend on auxiliary random variables
and hence interaction does not enlarge the rate region.
When there is large enough common randomness, it can
be observed from Theorem 1 that the rate region is again
characterized by (10) and (11) and hence interaction does not
enlarge the rate region.
B. Privacy required against only one user
• Only one user computes and privacy is required
against the other user: interaction and common random-
ness do not help to enlarge the rate region.
Let us consider the case where only Bob computes and
privacy against Alice is required. Then by substituting Z1 = ∅
in Theorem 3, it can be observed that the only active
constraint is R12 ≥ I(X;U[1:r]|Y ). Further, let us consider
R∗12 = min I(X;U[1:r]|Y ), where the minimization is over
conditional p.m.f.’s p(u[1:r]|x, y, z2) satisfying (4)-(5), and
U[1:r] −X − (Y, Z2) (20)
Z2 − (U[1:r], Y )−X (21)
Now let us consider R′12 = min I(X;U[1:r]|Y ) where the
minimization is only under (20) and (21). Then R∗12 ≥ R
′
12.
Further, it can be observed that R′12 is the minimum rate
achievable when r = 1. So R∗12 ≤ R
′
12. This shows that the
rate region is given by
{(R0, R12, R21 : R0 ≥ 0, R12 ≥ I(X;U |Y ), R21 ≥ 0}.
for some conditional p.m.f. p(u|x, y, z2) satisfying U −X −
(Y, Z2) and Z2 − (U, Y )−X . This shows that interaction and
the presence of common randomness do not help in this case.
• One extra round from rmin may strictly improve the
minimum sum-rate.
We show this through an example where both the users
compute a deterministic function of (X,Y ), and privacy against
Bob alone is required. Let Y be an m-length vector of uniform
binary random variables, Y = (Y1, . . . , Ym), and X consists
of a uniform binary random variable V and a random variable
J which is uniformly distributed on [1 : m], i.e., X = (V, J).
We assume that Y , V and J are independent. Both users want
to compute function Z = (J, V ∧ YJ), where “∧” represents
the binary AND function. In this example, it is easy to see
that rmin is 2 with Bob starting the communication. We show
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that the optimum sum rate R12 +R21 for two round protocol
is logm + 1/2 + m. Then we give a three round protocol,
with Alice starting the communication, which has the sum rate
logm + 1/2 + 1. We also show that logm + 1/2 + 1 is the
minimum achievable sum-rate with any r (r ≥ 3) rounds of
protocol. Details can be found in the extended version.
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APPENDIX
Explanation for (14)-(16):
I(X;U[1:r]|Y ) = I(X;U[1:r]|Y ) + I(X;Z2|U[1:r], Y ) (22)
= I(X;U[1:r], Z2|Y )
= I(X;Z2|Y ) + I(X;U[1:r]|Z2, Y )
= I(X;Z2|Y ), (23)
where (22) follows from (7), and (23) follows from (9).
Similarly, I(Y ;U[1:r]|X) = I(Y ;Z1|X). Also,
I(U[1:r];Z1, Z2|X,Y )
= I(U[1:r];Z1|X,Y ) + I(U[1:r];Z2|X,Y, Z1)
= I(U[1:r];Z1|X,Y ) (24)
= I(U[1:r];Z1|X,Y ) + I(Z2;Z1|U[1:r], X, Y ) (25)
= I(U[1:r], Z2;Z1|X,Y )
= I(Z1;Z2|X,Y ) + I(U[1:r];Z1|Z2, X, Y )
= I(Z1;Z2|X,Y ), (26)
where (24) follows from (8), (25) follows from (7), and (26)
follows from (9).
Proof of Theorem 2: ‘Only if’ direction follows directly
from Theorem 1. For the ‘if’ direction, we show that if a
scheme computes (qXY , qZ1Z2|XY ) with R12 and R21 equal to
I(Z2;X|Y )+δ and I(Z1;Y |X)+δ respectively, and with some
R0, under no privacy, then this scheme will also satisfy the
privacy conditions (2)-(3). From the converse of [5, Theorem 1],
we have nR12 ≥ I(M[1:r];X
n|Y n,W ). Then we get
nR12 ≥ I(M[1:r];X
n|Y n,W )
= I(M[1:r],W ;X
n|Y n) (27)
= I(M[1:r],W ;X
n|Y n)
+ I(Zn2 ;X
n|M[1:r],W, Y
n) (28)
= I(Zn2 ,M[1:r],W ;X
n|Y n)
= I(Zn2 ;X
n|Y n) + I(M[1:r],W ;X
n|Y n, Zn2 )
= I(Zn2 ;X
n|Y n) + I(M[1:r],W ;X
n, Zn1 |Y
n, Zn2 )
− I(M[1:r],W ;Z
n
1 |X
n, Y n, Zn2 )
≥ I(Zn2 ;X
n|Y n) + I(M[1:r],W ;X
n, Zn1 |Y
n, Zn2 )
−H(Zn1 |X
n, Y n, Zn2 )
≥ n [I(Z2;X|Y )− ǫ1] + I(M[1:r],W ;X
n, Zn1 |Y
n, Zn2 )
− n [H(Z1|X,Y, Z2) + ǫ2] , (29)
where (27) is due to the independence of common randomness
W and (Xn, Y n), (28) follows from the Markov chain
Zn2 − (W,Y
n,M[1:r])− (X
n, Zn1 ). We used the following fact
in (29): if two random variables A and A′ with same support
set A satisfy ||pA − pA′ ||1 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1/4, then it follows from
[17, Theorem 17.3.3] that |H(A)−H(A′)| ≤ η log |A|, where
η → 0 as ǫ → 0. Now (1) implies (29), where ǫ1, ǫ2 → 0
as ǫ → 0. When H(Z1|X,Y, Z2) = 0, from (29) we have
I(M[1:r],W ;X
n, Zn1 |Y
n, Zn2 ) ≤ δ + ǫ1 + ǫ2 for δ → 0,
and ǫ1, ǫ2 → 0 as ǫ → 0, which is the required privacy
condition against Bob. Similar argument holds for R21 when
H(Z2|X,Y, Z1) = 0.
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